Hahn problem are identical, except that for the former questions the interest rate is taken as an exogenous parameter (which varies to generate alternative steady-state equilibria), while for the latter stability question a savings-investment condition must be supplemented so that the interest rate is determined endogenously. This formal similarity is enough to suggest that there exists some relationship between paradoxical behavior and Hahn instability. More precisely, it is natural to conjecture a form of Samuelson's Correspondence Principle;4 that is, to conjecture that steady-state points that exhibit paradoxical behavior are dynamically unstable in some sense, and conversely. To illustrate that this conjecture is an exact application of the Correspondence Principle, at least when the labor force is constant, we quote Samuelson's original statement:
In a previous paper5 it was pointed out that there exists an intimate formal dependence between comparative statics and dynamics. To my knowledge this had not previously been explicitly enunciated in the economic literature, and for lack of a better name I shall refer to it as the Correspondence Principle. It is the purpose here to probe more deeply into its analytical character, and also to show its two-way nature: not only can the investigation of the dynamic stability of a system yield fruitful theorems in statical analysis, but also known properties of a (comparative) statical system can be utilized to derive information concerning the dynamic properties of a system.6
The notion that some Correspondence Principle provided a logical connection between the Cambridge controversy and the Hahn problem was implicit in private conversations around M.I.T. in the later 1960's, but to our knowledge the only published version of this idea is Solow's statement in his Foreword to Burmeister and Dobell (1970) 
Third, there are problems connected with the "paradoxes" discussed by Burmeister and Dobell in Chapter 8. The key difficulty may be one of interpretation. The paradoxes themselves show that some simple conclusions deduced from models with one capital good need not hold from more general models, but it remains to be seen how significant this is. If the paradoxes matter at all, they are likely to matter for this ubiquitous question of convergence to steady states. The simpler question is whether such paradoxes can be observed in an optimizing economy, or whether if an optimal path comes upon such a situation, it will go around it, so to speak, so "paradoxical behavior" will never be observed along an optimal path. In general, even this question remains unanswered, although some particular cases, with especially simple criterion 4. All the conclusions of our analysis here remain valid when the exogenous growth rate of labor g is set equal to zero. In this special case the steady-state comparisons we are making involve comparative statics. (When g > 0, the alternative comparisons involve comparative dynamics.) 5. Samuelson (1941 (ii) The solution to (1) entails 2n necessary differential equations, namely n differential equations describing the accumulation of the per capita capital stocks and the n differential equations governing the price movements of these capital goods. (These prices are in terms of "utility units" as numeraire and are denoted by the vector p.) When the utility function is linear with u(c) = c, this set of 2n differential equations is identical to the dynamic equations for the Hahn problem with a fixed value of r. Upon reflection it should be realized that Conjecture CP is too good to be true. If it were valid generally, it would justify nearly all of the conventional neoclassical wisdom based on the Solow-Swan one-sector model. For example, were Conjecture CP valid, it could be argued legitimately that while paradoxical steady-state equilibria are possible, an optimizing economy "almost never" would be observed at (or near) such a rest point because, as we shall argue below, that point would be an unstable saddlepoint in the sense of Definition 3. Likewise, as we shall prove in Section V below, were Conjecture CP valid, transitions between steady-state equilibria based on a naive rule using Solow's concept of the social rate of return would never cause movements away from a saddlepoint-stable rest point solution to problem (1) in the (c, p) plane.
It is precisely because Conjecture CP is so powerful that it becomes crucial to learn under what conditions it may be valid. In retrospect the answer is not surprising; as we shall prove below as Theorem 1, Conjecture CP is valid when there exists only one kind of capital good, i.e., n = 1. While this result will be disappointing to ardent neoclassicists, it is not a trivial proposition because "paradoxical consumption behavior" definitely can occur even when n = 1, provided that the possibility of joint production is admitted.8
For n > 1 our analysis is divided into two cases: (a) joint production is excluded, and (b) joint production exists. The simplicity of the no-joint production case is due to the fact that for any given p, a corresponding rest point solution to problem (1), if it exists, must be unique. In case (a) we then are able to prove, under certain assumptions,9 that the local stability properties of all rest points are 8. See Burmeister and Turnovsky (1972) . 9. Most important, our assumptions must be strong enough to justify a local stability analysis based on the associated linear system. The validity of these linear approximations necessitates that none of the 2n characteristic roots of the associated linear system has a zero real part (thereby excluding both zero and purely imaginary roots).
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identical. If the rest point corresponding to the Ramsey problem with p = 0 is a regular saddlepoint, as will be true for nonpathological problems, it follows that every rest point solution to problem (1) is also a regular saddlepoint. As an immediate consequence of our results, we find that under these conditions unstable points (in the saddlepoint sense) and hence limit cycles are precluded.
In the joint production case there may exist several rest point solutions to problem (1) for the same value of p (necessarily positive since the Golden Rule point at p = 0 is unique). Ironically, we are then able to state a valid Correspondence Principle and to prove what in 1942 Samuelson called a "separation" theorem;10 our results are quite parallel."
What, then, shall we be able to conclude from our analysis, which follows? First, while the most powerful form of a Correspondence Principle, stated above as Conjecture CP, would justify many results based on the neoclassical parable, it is valid generally only when there is one type of capital good, i.e., n = 1. Second, when there is no joint production and certain other assumptions are satisfied, every rest point is a regular saddlepoint in the sense of Definition 3. Third, when joint production exists, a Correspondence Principle is valid in that, under certain conditions, a paradoxical point in the sense of Definition 1 is not a regular saddlepoint in the sense of Definition 3. Moreover, a Separation Theorem obtains in that regular saddlepoints are separated from unstable saddlepoints. Finally, if (i) a steady-state point (p-, k) is unique for a given p _ 0 (which is always true when joint production is excluded), or (ii) the economy is regular in the sense of Definition 2 (which implies uniqueness of rest points for our model), then it can be shown that, with certain additional assumptions, every steady state is a regular saddlepoint in the sense of Definition 3, thus proving a Correspondence Principle that regularity implies saddlepoint stability. While the conditions under which these statements are true are restrictive, they do seem to include cases of genuine economic interest.
Given that we have demonstrated that optimal dynamics are extremely complex, what can one say with regard to policy? When does a simple rate of return rule lead to qualitatively correct policy advice? Again we show that the Correspondence Principle applies here: For regular economies, a simple rule based on Solow's social rate of return will lead to the correct optimal rest point.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. In 10. "Points of stable equilibrium (in the small) are separated by points of definitely unstable equilibrium; and vice versa." Samuelson (1942), p. 10.
11. See Theorem 5 in Section IV below.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Section II we introduce the basic model, notation, and assumptions, and we then prove that Conjecture CP is valid when n = 1. In Section III we treat the no-joint production case, while the complicated joint production case in which there may exist multiple rest points for the same value of p is analyzed briefly in Section IV. Finally, in Section V we apply our previous results and derive the conditions under which rules based on Solow's social rate of return do or do not provide legitimate criteria for transitions between steady states.
II. THE BASIC MODEL, NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS, AND
ANALYSIS OF THE n = 1 CASE
The Basic Model, Notation, and Assumptions
The economy produces n investment goods Yi (i = 1, 2,... , n) and one consumption good12 C, using labor L, and capital Ki (i = 1, 2, ... , n), where every factor of production is required, either directly or indirectly, to produce the consumption good and where no output of any commodity is possible without a positive labor input. The labor force grows at a constant rate g _ 0, and we have The production set W is said to exhibit no-joint production if it is (or may be regarded as being) generated by n + 1 neoclassical production functions, as defined by Burmeister i dp dp dp = sgn (pYpik') (2.22) = sgn (ppTk').14 2.2. The n = 1 Case a. No-joint production. In this case, for any given p _ 0, a steady state, if it exists, is unique, and has the regular saddlepoint property. Steady states are nonparadoxical in the sense of Definition 1 (see Theorem 2 below).
b. Joint production case. In this case, for any given p > 0, there may exist more than one steady state. This possibility was considered in Liviatan and Samuelson (1969) , where the relationship between instability and dk/dp was established: for p > 0, steady-state rest points at which dk/dp < 0 are regular saddlepoints and those at which dk/dp > 0 are unstable in the sense of Definition 3. Finally, we establish a property that is true for the n = 1 case but not true for the more general (n > 1) case. THEOREM 2. For n = 1, a paradoxical steady-state point occurs only at values of p giving rise to multiple rest points. In other words, dc/dp 0 for p $ 0.
Proof. Suppose that there were some p0 5r-4 0 at which dc/dp In such instances a more complex analysis is required using approximation involving higher order terms of a Taylor series expansion around equilibrium; similar results then can be derived. We also note that if J has a pure imaginary root, the associated linear system will have a closed path about the equilibrium point. We are not aware of any continuous-time economic model with our criterion function for which the optimizing trajectory is a closed path. The proof of Theorem 4 is available from the authors upon request. We cannot say much about (p3, k3) given only that (p1, k1) is stable. However, if we know that (p3, k3) is a regular saddlepoint as well as (p1, k 1), then we can state the following. THEOREM 5 (separation theorem). The points of stable equilibrium (in the saddlepoint sense) (pl, k1) and (p3, k3) are separated by a point of unstable equilibrium (p2, k2). that if n is even, then (p2, k2) is not completely unstable. This result seems quite reasonable. For the case n = 2, apparently the policy functions ki = ki(k1, k2) are as depicted in Figure III , where in general the n policy functions k = k (k) represent the solution to the synthesis problem, i.e., the optimal control law in feedback form. Actually, an alternative and weaker condition will suffice for our purposes, namely, the condition that every efficient transition (5.5) from a steady state with consumption c to one with consumption c* has the property that the transition would be preferred, on welfare grounds, to remaining in the initial steady state if the rate of time preference were in fact r*, i.e., c(t) must satisfy (5.9b) c(t)e-r*tdt > f ie-r*tdt While the condition (5.9b) seems more obscure than (5.9a), they are interchangeable in all that follows. Note that we are assuming here that efficient transitions between these two "adjacent" steady states are possible, and that there exist such transitions satisfying (5.5)-(5.9a) or, alternatively, (5.5)-(5.7) and (5.9b). The technical problems involved to ensure that these conditions will be met are far from trivial, but they are not of economic consequence for our expositional purposes in this section. Moreover, it is clear that transitions meeting all of our requirements do exist for a Leontief-Sraffa technology with alternative techniques of production (see Solow (1967) ). With this important warning we proceed with our story.
It is interesting to note
Should our imaginary economy undertake the transition just described? The answer to this question depends in part on the relationship between c, T, c*, r*, and p. As a first step toward finding an answer, we prove a slight generalization of Solow's Theorem. 
